ABSTRACT---An indirect utility model is employ for measuring farmers willingness to voluntarily accept yield losses for a reduction in environmental risk by decreasing pesticide use. Results support the hypothesis that farmers have self-described risk perceptions that enable them to make assessments of risk-yield tradeoffs. Policies designed to encourage and assist farmers making voluntary pesticide reductions can result in environmental risk reduction.
VOLUNTARY ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISK TRADEOFFS IN CROP PROTECTION DECISIONS
Crop protection alternatives in the 21st century are evolving in response to public demand for dual goals of crop and environmental protection. Passage of the Food Quality Protection Act in 1996 could mean new restrictions on pesticide use, with tolerances tightened to meet the negligible health risk standards required by the law (Jaenicke, 1997) .
At the same time, alternative treatments such as bioengineered pest resistance are being challenged on safety grounds (Greenpeace International, 1997) . Management changes hold promise for reducing environmental risk, but lack of management expertise and concern over yield reductions are barriers to widespread adoption (Jaenicke, 1997) .
Emerging research will focus on systems that combine chemical, biological and management strategies for protection of crops and human and environmental health (Council for Agricultural Science and Technology [CAST], 1995) . More choices will be available, testing farmers' capacity to assess environmental and economic risk tradeoffs in order to select appropriate systems. We quantify these risk tradeoffs under current crop protection options for Midwest farmers and relate the results to new strategies for environmental protection.
Policy makers in the past have used command and control regulation, taxes, legal solutions and tradeable permits to solve pollution problems. Now increasing emphasis is regulations (Vickery and Lohr, 1997) . Arora and Cason (1996) noted that little economic research on voluntary compliance was done prior to development and initial implementation of such approaches. By identifying and quantifying risk perceptions that modify the economic crop protection decision, we can suggest design elements for voluntary environmental protection programs that will increase their probability of success. How strongly farmers value environmental and economic factors will affect the range of crop protection choices they are willing to consider implementing and the degree of environmental protection that can be expected to result from their decisions.
In this study, we quantify the willingness of farmers to trade yield losses for environmental gains. 
Valuing Risk Tradeoffs
Farmers' attitudes about chemical risk and perceived advantages of reducing pesticide use have been mainly ignored in research. The exclusion of lay opinion about risk due to chemical reduction is common, yet research that relies on expert opinion and observed data for risk usually exaggerates losses and ignores important sources of knowledge that could influence these estimates (Jaenicke, 1997; Higley and Wintersteen, 1996) . Much research fails to account for the environment-related and production-related benefits from pesticide reduction (Jaenicke, 1997 Figure 1 illustrates the source of this limitation using the scenario of the farm producer.
Let ABC represent the frontier of available farm enterprise returns -environmental risk combinations facing the producer. The producer selects the optimal production point B from this frontier, where the locus of EU is tangent to the enterprise returns frontier.
Market data and observed prices can provide evidence on the slope of the tangency with the frontier ABC. Information about the shape of the producer's utility function is available only for the rate of tradeoff at the tangency with the returns frontier. Viscusi and Evans (1990) noted that a strength of quasimarket data obtained by survey is that it tracks a change in the farmer's risk condition, permitting estimation of individual utility functions.
The tradeoff between environmental benefits and yield loss is valued through the farmer's maximized utility function. The attitudes a farmer expresses reveal this underlying utility function and the expectations about risks of costs and benefits from reducing pesticide applications. The utility function determines the choice among crop protection options. Modeling this function avoids the discrepancy between market choices and utility functions noted by Viscusi and Evans (1990) .
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Cost of reducing chemical use is acceptable yield loss, measured as expected revenue loss. This value is the upper limit on willingness to pay for gains from pesticide reduction, since any lesser yield loss down to zero would also be acceptable if the same benefits were gained. Benefit to the farmer is protection of the environment, measured as the subjective rating of importance in protecting amenities from pesticide impacts.
In quasimarket studies, individuals have had difficulty assessing values for environmental goods that are not directly consumed as commodities or production inputs, due to lack of experience with the goods and disassociation of actions with environmental consequences (Diamond and Hausman, 1993) . Unrealistic attitudes about the affordability and method of payment for the perceived benefits of an environmental good also hinder valuation efforts (Mitchell and Carson, 1989 ). An individual who recognizes the importance of an environmental good may offer a payment for the good that exceeds his or her budget constraint.
Survey evidence suggests that farmers may be better prepared than the general public to evaluate the risk tradeoff as they have more information about both benefits and costs of reducing pesticide use. Rockwell et al. (1991) confirmed that farmers are aware of their budget constraints and have experiential and science-based information on the yield risk from cutting back pesticide use. Also, farmers have demonstrated greater awareness of environmental impacts of management decisions, particularly for ground and surface water (Rockwell et al., 1991) . Farmers are aware of the distinction between production-related and environment-related benefits of pesticide reduction and may be
expected to value them accordingly (Jaenicke, 1997) . Quasimarket valuation provides an appropriate way to measure farmers' risk tradeoffs.
Decision Framework
Begin with the producer's indirect utility function defined over environmental goods, G, and the choices of management practices including pesticide applications conditional on environmental risks. Let V be the state-dependent utility function when The acceptable yield loss (L*) is the dollar amount that equates the conditional ex ante indirect utility functions for the two choices where V is the indirect utility
difference. The empirical model for the acceptable yield loss for each producer depends systematically on the variables defined above:
Random and unobserved factors that influence yield loss appear in the error term denoted as . We specify marginal utility of income as constant across states of environmental * quality and independent of income. McConnell (1990) noted that income is typically inferred from ranges and subject to differing levels of state and local taxes and its inclusion creates the potential for measurement error. Monetary yield losses associated with reduced pesticides were not expected to significantly alter utility of income derived from farm operations. Econometric tests also confirmed that the marginal utility of income was constant, so income was excluded from the monetary yield loss model in equation 3.
Holding indirect utility constant while environmental risk varies defines the yield loss L* implicitly as a function of risk denoted as L*(e), where risk change is e = e -e p np (Harrington and Portney, 1987) . The total derivative of V with respect to e is set equal to zero along the indifference curve so that This term is the marginal willingness to pay for a decrease in environmental risk. Harrington and Portney (1987) emphasized that the marginal willingness to pay depends 9 on the producer's indirect utility function. We model this function using environmental attitudes, farm characteristics and state level regulatory and environmental conditions. We implemented the model for valuing subjective risk tradeoffs by farmers using a quasimarket interview approach applied and validated by Viscusi and Evans (1990) . Higley and Wintersteen (1996) confirmed that producers have experience in valuing environmental costs associated with insecticide and herbicide decisions in pest control.
Farmers were asked to numerically rate the importance they place on avoiding risk for eleven environmental goods that could be affected by insecticide and herbicide use. Then they evaluated their acceptable yield loss for using one less application of insecticides contingent on the reduction eliminating a moderate risk to the rated amenities. A herbicide reduction response was generated following the same procedures. The definition of "moderate risk" was based on persistence and toxicity ratings for impacts on water quality and organisms (Higley and Wintersteen, 1992) . The elimination of the moderate risk by this action was presented as a certain probability.
The empirical structure in equation 3 is linked directly to the questionnaire presented to farmers, in which they were asked to value their acceptable yield loss. In this form, we can use the survey data to econometrically estimate the parameters that describe this relationship and test their statistical significance. We propose a system of equations to account for the possible linkage of the insecticide and herbicide decisions through the underlying utility function. Equation 3 indicates through that acceptable yield loss 1 increases with intensity of environmental attitudes. The more strongly farmers feel about environmental protection, the greater their willingness to pay for environmental protection through yield losses.
Sample Description
To estimate the model, we used data from 1,124 questionnaires returned in a survey by Wintersteen (1992, 1996) of field crop producers in Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska and Ohio. Corn and soybeans are the main crops grown in these states. The initial mailing was in early July 1990, and a reminder and duplicate survey form were mailed to each nonrespondent in early August 1990. Details of the survey administration are available in Wintersteen (1992, 1996) .
Individual characteristics in the decision model include acres farmed, years in farming, and years of formal education. Respondents separately rated the importance of avoiding insecticide and herbicide risks for 11 environmental goods using a 10-point Likert scale, with 1 corresponding to "Not Important" and 10 corresponding to "Very Important." This scale has been validated in studies of risk perceptions held by consumers (Eom, 1994) and by producers (Weaver, 1996) and offers a simple and easily interpretable measure of risk attitudes. The mean cumulative ratings were 92.9 for insecticide risk and Since individual responses may be influenced by environmental conditions and regulations that vary by state, we supplemented the survey data with two indexes constructed from the 1991-1992 Green Index (Hall and Kerr, 1992 Ohio. The range of acceptable losses from reducing herbicide application was $0.00 to $50.00 per acre.
The summary results confirmed two critical perceptions. First, virtually all producers recognize the importance of environmental risks from both insecticides and herbicides. But some producers do not accept the premise that they should pay to help avoid environmental risks. The acceptable yield loss was zero for 14 percent of the sample for insecticide risk avoidance and 10 percent for herbicides, indicating an unwillingness to pay any environmental costs. Wintersteen (1992, 1996) concluded from sample statistics that bias in these values due to a disproportionate number of environmentally concerned producers was unlikely.
Results
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The definitions of variables used in the model are presented in Table 2 These indexes reflect the environmental conditions and agricultural pollution levels in each state. Each producer from a given state has the same values for the two variables, so that 14 any significant variation due to state conditions is detectable. These scores were discussed in the previous section.
Maximum likelihood estimates for the seemingly unrelated system of yield loss equations are presented in Table 3 . We tested the hypothesis of constant marginal utility of income across states of environmental quality variables. The likelihood ratio test for the restricted and unrestricted models yielded a calculated ! value of 1.912, which did Since there is little variation in crop mix in the four states, there is little chance that large per unit price differences in chemicals are responsible for this result. Farmers who spend more may have better yields and so may be able to tolerate larger yield losses in return for environmental protection. Farm size in acreage has no effect on risk tradeoffs, suggesting voluntary chemical reduction is not scale-dependent.
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Estimated coefficients on FARMYR and EDUC were positive and significant for the insecticide equation, but only FARMYR was significant for the herbicide tradeoff.
More experienced, better educated farmers accept greater yield losses to avoid environmental risks from insecticides. For herbicides, fewer alternatives have been proven effective so that education may have little effect on ability to substitute nonchemical methods. These farmers risk greater losses in human capital from health effects of environmental damage than less experienced, less educated farmers. More experience and education imply necessary skills and knowledge to adjust crop protection practices while reducing applications, and greater awareness of the effects on environmental goods.
INSECN was not a significant factor influencing willingness to pay for environmental protection through insecticide reduction, but HRBECN has a significant positive effect on the herbicide risk tradeoff. The mean sample value for INSECN was 53.2 and for HRBECN was 52.5, close to the maximum rating of 60. Avoiding risk to environmental goods that have productivity impacts is very important to farmers, but this concern does not alter acceptable yield losses for insecticide risk. Extensive water quality testing in the Midwest revealed that herbicides are a major contaminant, while insecticide pollution has not been significant. A second barrier is that farmers may feel they place themselves at a competitive disadvantage if they unilaterally reduce insecticide or herbicide use. The benefit of risk avoidance is shared by everyone, but producers who reduce chemical use bear the full cost. The questionnaire asked farmers to consider only their willingness to pay, in the absence of any contribution by other farmers. If they knew others would reduce chemicals by an equal amount, farmers might be motivated to pay less. Arora and Cason (1996) showed that publicity about and consumer awareness of voluntary compliance tend to increase participation rates. They recommended that these features are important design considerations for promotional programs. Several voluntary agricultural programs give highly publicized awards for exceptional performance (Vickery and Lohr, 1997) , which 20 can encourage competition and raise the average and total willingness to pay for risk reduction.
Third, the crowding out effect of encouraging environmental risk reduction, defined by the five factors in INSENV and HRBENV, at the expense of economic risk reduction, defined by the six factors in INSECN and HRBECN, should be avoided. With fewer alternatives to herbicide use available, and more evidence of pervasive contamination by herbicides, farmers tend to consider both aspects of risk in their willingness to pay for risk reduction. With insecticides, primarily environmental factors are being valued. Since herbicide risk reduction generates higher willingness to pay than insecticide risk reduction, any program that focusses on birds, fish, mammalian wildlife, native plants and endangered species will be less cost-effective than a broader emphasis encompassing human, insect and livestock health risks. Most programs to assist in farm risk reduction address a range of potential risks (Vickery and Lohr, 1997) . Our research suggests that whole farm planning programs to assist in voluntary risk assessment and management will be highly successful in making agriculture more economically and environmentally sustainable in the 21st century.
